


NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 April 1981

NOTE FOR: The Director

Attached are some notes on CIA/DOD
problems for your use in talking with
Secretary Weinberger.



John McMahon
Director

Attachment:
As Stated

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Notes for Conversation with Secretary of Defense Weinberger

1. Net Assessments in NIEs.

Problem. Since 1977, DoD intelligence agencies have objected to the results of certain US-USSR force interaction analyses appearing in NIEs of Soviet strategic programs. They have objected on two grounds: (1) the analyses constituted net assessments that are properly the responsibility of the Department of Defense; and (2) the net assessments were oversimplified measures of the strategic balance and consequently misleading.

-- The argument on grounds of bureaucratic prerogatives is without merit.

-- Practically all intelligence estimates of future developments involve analysis of the likely interactions of foreign and US interests, policies, programs and forces.

-- I am sympathetic to the substantive argument. I have asked Paul Nitze to advise me as to the type of assessments which should be used in NIEs on Soviet strategic programs that would best convey the implications of future Soviet strategic forces.

(For your background, attached are the answers to questions on this issue received from the SSCI earlier this month.)

2. Nuclear Proliferation and DoD Planning

Problem. We see no evidence that DoD contingency planning is taking account of nuclear proliferation.

-- A substantial commitment of Intelligence Community collection and analytical resources has been made to monitoring the spread of nuclear weapon technology and capabilities to countries in the Near East and South Asia

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-- We believe that nuclear proliferation represents a substantial threat to US security interests in this highly volatile region of the world.

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3. Information Sharing.

Problem. Access to planning, research and development and operational data continue to be difficult.

- No formal mechanism for information flow exists.
- DoD fears CIA misuse of information; perceives "no need to know."
- SIGs provide limited access to DoD policies/planning.

For example:

- The continued lack of access to Navy research and development activities related to antisubmarine warfare is hindering our ability to fully assess Soviet capabilities.
- We are overly dependent upon informal analyst-to-analyst contacts for access to Blue force data.
- The lack of information on US plans and operations weakens the estimative process and product.

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